University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 1 Fall 2009

Article 5

2009

Comments: Gender Confusion: The Need for
Effective Legislation to Protect against Gender
Identity Discrimination
Courtney J. Jefferson
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jefferson, Courtney J. (2009) "Comments: Gender Confusion: The Need for Effective Legislation to Protect against Gender Identity
Discrimination," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 39: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol39/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

GENDER CONFUSION: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE
LEGISLATION TO PROTECT AGAINST GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION.
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine interviewing for a job for which you are fully qualified. 1
The process goes well, and you receive the highest interview score
amongst all of the applicants. 2 Ultimately, the employer offers you
the job because you are '"significantly better than the other
candidates,"' and you accept it. 3 At this point, you choose to disclose
private information about yourself to your future employer, including
details about medical procedures that you are currently undergoing
and will undergo in the future. 4 The procedures do not affect your
ability to perform the functions of your job. 5 Nevertheless, because
of this conversation and the information you choose to disclose, the
employer rescinds the offer of employment. 6 It may seem far-fetched
that an employer can or will rescind a job offer based solely upon
one's private life or medical treatments. However, under both
Maryland7 and federal 8 law, transgendered individuals may be
subjected to such employment action if they disclose their
transgendered status to a current or potential employer. 9
The situation described above is precisely what Diane Schroer 10
experienced after interviewing for a position with the Library of
Congress. 11 Charlotte Preece, who initially offered Schroer the job,
recanted the offer after a lunch meeting where Schroer disclosed her
I.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

II.

See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008).
See id. at 296.
See id.
See id. at 296-97.
See id. at 302.
See id. at 299.
See infra Part Vl.A.
See infra Part III. C.
See, e.g., Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
Ms. Schroer was born a genetic male named David Schroer. /d. at 295. At the time of
the incident she had not yet transitioned from male to female. /d. However, she filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as "Diane J.
Schroer." /d. at 293. As such, she will be referred to using the feminine pronoun.
For purposes of this Comment, all transgendered individuals will be referred to by
their preferred gender identity, regardless of their biological sex at birth.
See id. at 295.
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status as transgendered. 12 By Preece's own admission, it was
Schroer's decision to transition from male to female that raised
concerns about hiring her. 13 Although the District Court ultimately
ruled in Schroer's favor under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 14 it is unclear whether the statute actually required the court to
find unlawful discrimination on the part of the Library of Congress. 15
Furthermore, the statute does not explicitly prohibit discrimination
against transgendered individuals. 16
Diane Schroer is not the only person to experience employment
discrimination due to gender identity. 17 Federal appellate courts
encountered claims of gender identity discrimination as early as
1977. 18 Initially, there was little question as to whether Title VII 19
protected individuals against gender identity discrimination - it did
not. 20 In 1989, however, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII in a
way that made some courts re-evaluate their position on gender
identity discrimination under the statute. 21 In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 22 the Supreme Court determined for the first time that Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex also
prevented employers from engaging in sex stereotyping. 23 This
interpretation resulted in new litigation that forced the federal circuits
to reconsider the issue of whether Title VII provides protection
against gender identity discrimination in employment. 24
This Comment will evaluate the current status of gender identity
discrimination in employment. It will first discuss the various

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
I 7.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Jd. at 296.
Jd. at 297.
Jd. at 308. The court relied upon the Sixth Circuit's holding that discrimination on the
basis of an individual's transgendered status constitutes sex stereotyping and is
prohibited under the rationale of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 303. It further found that the Library's decision to rescind
Schroer's job offer "was literally discrimination 'because of ... sex."' I d. at 308.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); see also infra Part III.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
See infra Part III.
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
See id. The Ninth Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from
terminating employees due to their decision to undergo gender reassignment.
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Jd.
Id. at 250. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the scope of Title VII in the Court's
decision).
See infra Part III.C.
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meanings of gender identity/ 5 as well as how federae 6 and state
legislation 27 has responded to claims of gender identity
discrimination. It will then focus on how the State of Maryland has
addressed this issue by evaluating legislation proposed in the
Maryland General Assembly, as well as ordinances enacted in cities
and counties in the state. 28
In defining gender identity discrimination, Part II of this Comment
will first examine the word "transgender" as a social and medical
concept. 29 A common misconception is that only those who have
undergone medical treatment to change their physical sex are
transgendered. 30 The term actually encompasses a far more diverse
group. 31 This Comment will further explain the ways in which
employers engage in either overt or subtle gender identity
discrimination. 32 Some employers engage in adverse action against
transgendered individuals in an open manner, acknowledging that
their decisions are motivated by an employee or potential employee's
gender identity. 33 More often, however, employers give neutral
explanations for their discriminatory actions. 34
After explaining basic concepts related to gender identity, this
Comment will evaluate the legal response to gender identity
discrimination at the federal level. 35 Part III will examine the federal
protection that is, debatably, currently provided against gender
identity discrimination. Specifically, Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination will be evaluated in light of the Supreme Court's
1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 36 which held that sex
discrimination exists where an employer engages in sex
stereotyping. 37 At present, the federal circuits are split in their
determination as to whether Title VII similarly prohibits
discrimination against transgendered individuals. 38 This Comment
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra Part Il.A.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part II.A.
See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002).
/d.
See infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D.D.C. 2008).
See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (7th Cir. 2000).
See infra Part III.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
/d. at 250.
See infra Part III. C.
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will examine this divide in order to evaluate the strength of Title VII
based gender identity protection in the circuits that have addressed
the issue. 39
The Supreme Court has not provided explicit guidance as to
whether Title VII prohibits gender identity discrimination. 40
Congress, however, has attempted to clarify the issue through new
legislation. 41 Part IV of this Comment will discuss two efforts in the
House of Representatives to pass an Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA). 42 The first act would have explicitly
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's
"actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity."43 The
amended ENDA contained lesser protection than its predecessor. 44 If
enacted, it would have prohibited employment discrimination on the
basis of an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation. 45 It
would not, however, have granted explicit protection to
transgendered individuals. 46 This Comment will discuss the current
status of each proposed bill. 47 It will then evaluate the impact of each
bill, as well as each proposed bill's potential implications for the
transgendered community. 48
After discussing gender identity discrimination under federal law,
this Comment will examine legal responses to the issue at the state
and local level. 49 At present, thirteen states and the District of
Columbia have statutes expressly prohibiting gender identity
discrimination in employment. 50 In many areas without state-level

39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra Part III.C.
See Darrell R. VanDeusen, VanDeusen on Gender Identity Discrimination: Gender
Identity Issues Under Title VII, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARIES, October 26,
2007, available at 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 793 (2007).
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 2015, llOth Cong. (2007);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
See H.R. 2015; H.R. 3685; see also infra Part IV.
H.R. 2015 § 4(a)(1)-{2).
Compare H.R. 3685 (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of actual or
perceived sexual orientation), with H.R. 2015 (prohibiting employment discrimination
based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity).
H.R. 3685.
See H.R. 3685.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK fORCE, JURISDICTIONS WITH EXPLICITLY
TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS (2008), http://www.the
taskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/all jurisdictions_w_pop_8_ 08.pd( As of
August of 2008, the states explicitly barring gender identity discrimination in
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protection, city and county legislatures have assumed the task of
granting necessary protection to transgendered persons. 51 Part V of
this Comment will evaluate state and local transgender discrimination
prohibitions, analyzing their strength and effectiveness. 52
Finally, this Comment will focus on legislation in the State of
Maryland. 53 Laws passed first in Baltimore City, 54 and more recently
in Montgomery County, 55 both contain language barring employers
from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of
their gender identities. 56 Part VI will discuss recent attempts by the
Maryland General Assembly to prohibit gender identity
discrimination. To date, the Maryland legislature has not followed
the example of other states and its own local jurisdictions;57 no statelevel legislation expressly protects individuals against gender identity
discrimination. 58
Maryland must amend its current antidiscrimination laws to adequately protect the transgendered
community.
II. DEFINITIONS

A. Gender Identity

Gender identity, simply stated, is an individual's "personal sense of
being male or female. " 59 Although it most often coincides with a
person's biological sex, such is not always the case. A transgendered
individual is one whose biological sex and psychological gender

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

employment include: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. !d.
!d.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 1-l(f) (2009).
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009). On November 13, 2007,
the Montgomery County Council unanimously enacted Bill 23-07. MONTGOMERY
COUNTY BILL 23-07 (2007). This new legislation expanded upon previous statutes
which included sexual orientation, but not gender identity, as a protected class. /d.
See BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4 § 1-l(f) (2009); Montgomery County Bill 2307 (2007).
The Maryland Constitution allows jurisdictions within its borders to obtain charters,
allowing them to enact local laws relating to matters designated in their charters. See
Mo. CONST. art. 11-A, § 3. Home rule jurisdictions can extend protection to
individuals in the locality beyond that provided by the state. !d.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-606 (LexisNexis 2009).
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008).
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identity do not match. 60 The term "transgender" is a broad one which
encompasses historically familiar concepts such as transsexuality61
and transvestitism, 62 as well as modern constructs such as
transgenderism. 63
In addition to social ideas attached to the concept, gender identity is
recognized and evaluated from a medical standpoint. 64 The American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders {DSM) recognizes Gender Identity Disorder (GID)
as a legitimate medical diagnosis. 65 It sets forth specific diagnostic
criteria which must be met to substantiate such a diagnosis:
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not
merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of
being the other sex). In children, the disturbance is
manifested by four (or more) of the following:
1. repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence that he
or she is, the other sex
2. in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating
female attire; in girls, insistence on wearing only
stereotypical masculine clothing
60.

61.

62.

63.

64.
65.

See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms
Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3-4 (Paisley Currah,
Richard M. Juang, & Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006).
See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transsexual is defined as being "a person who
strongly identifies with the opposite sex and may seek to live as a member of this sex
especially by undergoing surgery and hormone therapy to obtain the necessary
physical appearance (as by changing the external sex organs)." MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transsexual
(last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transvestite is an individual, often male, who
"adopts the dress and often the behavior typical of the opposite sex especially for
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
purposes of emotional or sexual gratification."
DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transvestite (last
visited Aug. 17, 2009).
See VanDeusen, supra note.40, at 2. Transgenderism occurs when a person lives fulltime in the gender opposite his or her biological sex. See Jessica Xavier, A Primer by
Transgender Nation (Feb. 25, 2007), available at http://www.critpath.org/plaftalk/tgprimer.htrn. Transgenderists differ from transexuals in that transgenderists,
although living as the opposite gender, often have no desire to undergo surgical
!d. Transgenderists also differ from transvestites, as
gender reassignment.
transvestites generally dress or behave as the opposite gender for sexual or emotional
gratification, and do not live full-time as that gender. Id.
See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 576-82 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
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3. strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex roles
in make-believe play or persistent fantasies of being
the other sex
4. intense desire to participate in the stereotypical
games and pastimes of the other sex
5. strong preference for playmates of the other sex
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical
intersex condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning. 66
Although individuals may be diagnosed with GID, such a diagnosis
is controversial and is not necessary for a person to be considered
transgendered. 67 An individual within any of the categories discussed
above may be considered transgendered, 68 and thus may be subjected
to gender identity discrimination in employment.
B. Forms ofDiscrimination
In its broadest articulation, employment discrimination occurs
when an employer takes adverse employment action against an
applicant or employee. 69 This goes beyond circumstances where an
employer fails to hire or terminates an individual-it also
encompasses circumstances where the employer acts against the
person's interests as they relate to "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment .... " 70 It can include actions which
range from passing over the individual for a promotion, to failing to

66.
67.

68.

69.
70.

/d. at 581.
See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2; Ken Hausman, Controversy Continues to Grow
Over DSM's G/D Diagnosis, 38 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 14, July 18, 2003, at 25,
available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/fulllpsychnews;38/14/25.
See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transgendered individual is defined as "a
person ... who identifies with or expresses a gender identity that differs from the one
which corresponds to the person's sex at birth." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transgender (last
visited Aug. 17, 2009).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
/d.
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provide paid leave where others receive it, or to giving an employee
unfavorable working hours. 71
In recent years, the federal courts have encountered a variety of
circumstances in which transgendered individuals allege gender
identity discrimination. 72
These include claims of sexual
harassment/3 retaliation/4 termination/5 and refusal to hire due to an
applicant's transgendered status. 76 Each of these claims clearly falls
within the definition of employment discrimination.
Of course, not all discrimination is actionable. If a plaintiff is to
succeed in a claim of employment discrimination, the employer's
actions must be prohibited under either state or federal law. 77 States
vary in the protections they afford to individuals. 78 In the federal
system, Title VII outlines the classes of people protected from
employment discrimination. 79
III. CURRENT FEDERAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER
IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION
A. The Starting Point for Gender Identity Discrimination Claims
Under Title VII

When the idea of gender identity discrimination first reached the
federal courts, there was little doubt as to whether transgendered
individuals were protected under Title VII. The Ninth Circuit was
the first appellate court to consider whether Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination also prevented employers from
discriminating based on gender identity. 80 The court responded to the
theory with a resounding "no. " 81
Ramona Holloway appealed to the Ninth Circuit after the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008); Smith, 378 F.3d at
567-68; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864. 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2000); Nichols, 256
F.3d at 869.
See Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1082; Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
See Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-WK, 2003 WL 21525058,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003).
See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
See infra Part V.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977); see also
VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1-2.
See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664.
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her claim of gender identity discrimination for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 82 The District Court reasoned that gender identity is not
a protected class under Title VII. 83
Although Holloway began working for Arthur Andersen in 1969,
she did not initially disclose her transgendered status. 84 It was not
until after she received a promotion in February of 1974 that she
informed her supervisor that she was receiving treatment "in
preparation for anatomical sex change surgery." 85 Four months later,
she received her annual performance review, during which a
company official suggested that she might "be happier at a new job
where her transsexualism would be unknown." 86 After the review,
Holloway received a pay raise. 87 Then, in November of that year,
Holloway made a request that her records be altered to reflect her
new name. 88 Arthur Andersen terminated her employment shortly
thereafter. 89 Holloway alleged that she was fired for being a
transsexual and that the company's actions were unlawful under Title
VII.9o
Because the District Court dismissed Holloway's claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit only addressed the issue
of whether transsexuality was protected under Title VII. 91 The court
referred to the lack of legislative history relating to the use of the
word "sex" in the statute and determined that Congress demonstrated
no intent to give the term anything other than its traditional
meaning. 92
It refused to expand the definition to protect
transsexuals. 93 Rather, it found that the prohibition against sex
discrimination in employment existed to require employers to treat
biological men and women equally. 94 Under this interpretation, Title
VII does not protect transgendered persons.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 661.
See id. at 662-63.
Jd. at 661.
/d. Holloway began female hormone treatments in 1970. ld.
Jd.
/d.
/d. "Ramona Holloway" was, in fact, her new name. Id. When Holloway began
working for Arthur Andersen in 1969, her legal name was "Robert Holloway." /d.
/d.
/d.
Id.
/d. at 662-63.
ld. at 663.
/d. Although the court also acknowledged that Title VII allows men and women to be
treated disparately if there is a bona fide relationship between the employment
qualifications and an individual's sex (a "BFOQ"), the concept is irrelevant for

146

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

The Ninth Circuit was not alone in its interpretation of Title VII's
protection as it pertained to gender identity. 95 The Eighth Circuit,
reached the same conclusion in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. ,96
a 1982 case appealed from a grant of summary judgment. 97 Audra
Sommers, a male to female transsexual, alleged she was
discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 98
Specifically, she claimed that her employer terminated her
employment due to her status as "a female with the anatomical body
of a male."99 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment,
finding that Title VII did not extend protection to those who are
discriminated against because of their transsexuality. 100 In so finding,
the court employed reasoning virtually identical to that of the Ninth
Circuit. 101
The Seventh Circuit followed suit when presented with the issue. 102
It overturned a decision in the Northern District of Illinois that
allowed recovery under Title VII to a plaintiff who was discriminated
against for being a transsexual. 103 The case concerned an airline
pilot, hired by Eastern Airlines as a male, who was terminated after
she returned to work as a female. 104 The court narrowly defined the
word "sex," determining that absent Congressional action to indicate
otherwise, Title VII protects only those who are_ discriminated against
for being biologically male or biologically female. 105 Having been

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
I 0 l.

102.
l 03.
104.
l 05.

purposes of this discussion. !d. Finding that gender identity discrimination is
prohibited under Title VII would do no more than confer standing to those who claim
they have been discriminated against for being transgendered. All established
exceptions to Title VII, which occasionally permit discrimination to occur legally,
would apply with equal force to transgendered persons.
See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Sommers
v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
667 F.2d 748.
/d. at 750.
/d. at 749.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 750. It also focused primarily on the dearth of legislative history relating to the
word "sex" used in Title VII, proceeding to acknowledge that the primary purpose of
the late addition to the statute was to ensure women be treated equally to men in
employment. /d. As such, absent an express congressional intent to grant protection
to transsexuals, no protection existed under Title VII. /d.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
/d. at I 082, l 084.
/d. at 1082-83. Karen Ulane was terminated despite the fact that she was able to
retain her Federal Aviation Administration certification. /d. at 1083.
See id. at l 087.
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discriminated against for being a transsexual, Karen Ulane was not
protected by the statute. 106
The pattern in the federal circuits, after these three cases, was clear:
transsexuals were not protected under Title VII. 107 The courts'
interpretation further indicated that only an act of Congress could
change this determination. 108
B. The Turning Point ofPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins 109
Although the federal courts agreed that Title VII afforded no
protection against gender identity discrimination, this basic
assumption changed in 1989. 110 At that time, the Supreme Court held
that Title VII prohibits not only discrimination based on an
individual's biological sex, but also discrimination based on a sex
stereotype. 111 In essence, employers are not permitted to make an
employment decision based on preconceived notions of how a man or
a woman should behave. 112
In its landmark decision of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 113 the
Court considered the case of Ann Hopkins. 114 Hopkins was
considered for a partnership at Price Waterhouse, a national
accounting firm. 115 Rather than receiving a partnership, Hopkins was
held over to be considered again the following year. 116 This occurred
despite numerous glowing compliments from partners in her office,
praising her character and job performance. 117
106. /d. The Seventh Circuit also focused primarily on congressional intent to resolve the
issue presented in the case. Id. at 1085.
107. See id. at 1085; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
108. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("If Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the
protection of Title VII, it may so provide. Until that time, however, we decline in
behalf of the Congress to judicially expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII
beyond its common and traditional interpretation."); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750;
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63.
109. 490 u.s. 228 (1989)
110. See id. at 250; see also VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 3.
111. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
112. See id.
113. 490 u.s. 228.
114. Id at 231.
115. Id. at 231-32.
116. /d. at 231.
117. /d. at 234. Hopkins was recognized as having one of the best records in the preceding
year "'in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership.'" /d. As
an employee, she was described as an '"outstanding professional'" who had a "'deft
touch, . . . strong character, independence and integrity."' /d. Her intellectual
faculties were also generously praised. See id.
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In addition to the positive remarks partners made about Hopkins,
some concerns were also expressed. 118 Namely, some of her
superiors viewed her as sometimes being "'overly aggressive, unduly
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff. "' 119 Each of
these points would seem legitimate if not for additional comments
that indicated that the partners were concerned about these attributes
solely because she was a woman. 120 Partners elaborated in their
remarks about Hopkins by describing her as "'macho,"' stating that
she "'overcompensated for being a woman,"' and suggesting that she
go to charm school. 121 Perhaps most shocking of all, however, was
the statement that if Hopkins wished to better her chances at
achieving partnership, she should "'walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry. "' 122 The Court, in a plurality opinion 123
written by Justice Brennan, recognized this statement as the "coup de
grace." 124
The Supreme Court proceeded to interpret Title VII's express
terms, finding that an employer discriminates "because of' sex if
"gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it
was made." 125 An individual need not prove that he or she was
discriminated against directly due to his or her biological sex. 126
Rather, the Court found that the person need only prove that the
employer relied upon "sex-based considerations" when making its
decision. 127 The Court accepted the District Court's determination
that the partners' comments constituted sex stereotyping. 128 More

118. !d. at 234-35.
119. !d. at 235.
120. See id.
121. !d. Additional comments were made in which some partners criticized her for using
profane language and one partner admitted that the real objection was that it was '"a
lady using foul language.'" !d. Further, one of Hopkins' supporters was quoted as
saying she '"ha[ d) matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner]
candidate."' !d.
122. !d.
123. Although the opinion was a plurality, six of the nine Justices agreed that sex
stereotyping does constitute discrimination "because of ... sex" under Title VII. See
id. at 250-51 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at
272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. !d. at 235 (plurality opinion).
125. !d. at 241.
126. !d.
127. !d. at 241-42.
128. !d. at 251.
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importantly, the Court refused to allow employers to engage in sex
stereotyping when making employment decisions:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for '[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.' 129
The status of gender identity discrimination under Title VII,
previously so clear, 130 has been questioned following the decision in
Price Waterhouse. 131 If sex stereotyping is prohibited under the
statute, the question becomes whether, by discriminating against
individuals due to their transgendered status, an employer is really
subjecting them to a sex stereotype. 132
C. The Current Circuit Split

After the Supreme Court handed down the Price Waterhouse
decision, the federal circuits began reexamining their approach to
gender identity discrimination under Title VII. 133 At present, there is
little consistency in the way transgendered individuals are treated in
the federal courts. 134 The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the
issue, and until it does, the question remains open whether Title VII
makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of
gender identity.
1. Seventh Circuit
Despite the holding in Price Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit
maintains precedent holding that Title VII does not protect
transgendered individuals. 135 The court has not directly reconsidered
gender identity discrimination claims under the statute, but it has

129.
130.
131.
132.

Jd.

See supra Part III.A.
VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1.
The sex stereotype in question would be that biological males and females should live
and present themselves as such full-time.
133. Shannon H. Tan, When Steve Is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why Courts and
Legislators Need to Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37
STETSON L. REV. 579, 589-90 (2007).
134. VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1.
135. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).

150

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

made clear that prior precedent disallowing transgender
discrimination claims is still valid. 136 The court quoted with approval
language from Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 137 when faced with the
question of whether a plaintiff can maintain a Title VII hostile work
environment claim when he is harassed due to his sexual
orientation. 138
Edison Spearman worked for Ford Motor Company when the
activity giving rise to his suit took place. 139 His coworkers engaged
in conduct ranging from calling him a "'little bitch"' 140 to writing
graffiti on a bulletin board reading "'Aids kills faggots dead ...
RuPaul, RuSpearman. "' 141 During the course of his employment,
Spearman repeatedly filed complaints of harassment to his
employer. 142 After Spearman filed suit, the district court granted
Ford's motion for summary judgment, finding that Spearman did not
show that he suffered adverse employment action. 143 The circuit
court, in affirming the lower court's decision, placed particular
emphasis on the perception that Spearman's coworkers were
motivated to harass him because he was a homosexual rather than
because he was a man. 144 The stereotypes he was subjected to were
viewed as related directly to his sexual orientation rather than his
biological sex. 145 The court viewed this as distinct from sex
stereotyping and found that Title VII afforded Spearman no

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

142.

143.
144.
145.

See id. at 1084.
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084.
Jd. at 1082.
Jd.
Jd. at 1083. Spearman also complained ofbehavior from his foreman, Anthony Perez.
Jd. Spearman alleged that he felt uncomfortable when, on two occasions, Perez
offered to give him a hug. !d. He was further bothered by a hypothetical Perez used
during a department meeting about sexual harassment. !d. The hypothetical was as
follows: "Say for instance, Greg and Ed are in the back bringing in a coil, and Ed
touches Greg in a way that made him feel uncomfortable, that can be a charge of
sexual harassment." /d. Although Perez claimed the hypothetical referred to a
different coworker, Spearman believed "Ed" was intended to be himself. !d.
!d. at 1082. Spearman filed his first complaint in December of 1995, after which he
did not file another until May 16, 1997. !d. A total of five complaints were filed
between that date and May 4, 1998, when Spearman returned to work following a
period of medical leave to find his toolbox destroyed and his tools stolen. !d. at 108284. At this point, Spearman filed suit against Ford Motor Company, alleging that the
company violated Title VII. !d. at 1084.
/d.
!d. at 1085-86.
I d. at 1086.

2009]

Gender Confusion: The Need for Effective Legislation

151

protection. 146 In so finding, it emphasized that Title VII "does not
prohibit harassment in general or of one's homosexuality in
particular." 147 In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs cannot maintain a
Title VII action for discrimination without directly connecting the
employer's conduct to either their biological sex or a related
stereotype. 148
Although Spearman focused on discrimination based on sexual
orientation rather than gender identity, district courts within the
Seventh Circuit regard it as effectively affirming the Ulane
decision. 149 Because Spearman was decided in 2000, it is seen to
demonstrate that Price Waterhouse does not alter the analysis of
transgender claims under Title VII. 150
2. Ninth Circuit
Since the Supreme Court decided. Price Waterhouse, the Ninth
Circuit has not had occasion to address directly the question of
whether transgendered individuals are also protected under the
statute. However, the court has clearly indicated that it will now give
a broader interpretation to the word "sex." 151 The court's previous
analysis in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 152 is no longer
considered valid. 153 In Schwenk v. Hartford, 154 the Ninth Circuit

146. See id.
147. /d.
148. See id. ("Because Spearman was not harassed because of his sex, his hostile
environment claim fails.") (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 78 (1998)).
149. See Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-HIK, 2003 WL 21525058,
at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003).
150. See id.; see also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A 00-3114, 2002 WL
31098541, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (citing Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084-85)
(distinguishing a claim based on a sex stereotype from one based on an individual's
gender identity; the former is protected under Price Waterhouse while the latter is
not).
151. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Schwenk
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); cf Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend protection of Title VII
to transsexuals because discrimination against transsexuals is on the basis of"gender"
rather than "sex.").
152. 566 F.2d 659.
153. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201. The Ninth Circuit did not expressly overrule its prior
holding in Holloway because a different question was before the court under a
different statute, the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMV A). /d. at 1194-95.
However, the court analogized Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to the
GMV A, acknowledging that the term "sex" extends beyond pure biological sex. /d. at
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analogized the meaning of "sex" under Title VII to the Gender
Motivated Violence Act. 155 In doing so, it acknowledged that, after
Price Waterhouse, the terms "sex" and "gender" are interchangeable
for purposes of Title VII analysis. 156 When people endure disparate
treatment due to their transgendered status, it can constitute sex
discrimination. 157 If a man is discriminated against for appearing
feminine, he is effectively subjected to the gender stereotype that
only women, and not men, should be feminine. 158 The court did not
hold that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is forbidden
under Title VII. 159 By acknowledging a broad definition of "sex,"
however, it provided future plaintiffs with the groundwork necessary
for transgender discrimination claims to succeed in the Ninth Circuit.
One year after the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the broadened
definition of "sex" under Title VII, it faced a case of sex
stereotyping. 160 Antonio Sanchez claimed he was harassed for failing
to meet coworkers' views of how a man should behave. 161 His
coworkers and supervisor continually referred to him in the feminine
and mocked him for being too effeminate. 162
Sanchez cited the holding of Price Waterhouse, contending that
imposing a sex stereotype on a man is prohibited in the same way
that imposing one on a woman is barred. 163 The court agreed with his
interpretation. 164 The court further concluded that the harassment
Sanchez's coworkers and supervisor subjected him to was, in fact,
closely related to sex. 165 He was perceived as being too feminine, and
suffered constant ridicule as a result. 166 Because the harassment

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

163.
164.
165.
166.

1201 ("The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been
overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse.").
204 F.3d 1187.
!d.
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
!d.
!d. at 870. Males who worked with Nichols ridiculed him for carrying himself'"like
a woman.'" !d. They further harassed him by calling him a "'faggot"' and a
'"fucking female whore."' !d.
Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874.
!d. at 874-75.
!d. at 874.
!d. The court found it significant that Sanchez's supervisor and coworkers chose
feminine pronouns with which to taunt him. !d. Sanchez's perceived femininity is
further underlined by the fact that "the most vulgar name-calling directed at [him] was
cast in female terms." !d.
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stemmed from a sex stereotype, that men should not be effeminate, it
clearly violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 167
To date, the Ninth Circuit has not officially recognized gender
identity discrimination claims under Title VII. The court's recent
line of precedent does, however, provide an expansive interpretation
of the word "sex" in Title VII. 168 At a minimum, sex stereotyping
claims fall firmly within those which can succeed. 169 It remains to be
seen whether transgendered individuals will find themselves
protected in the Ninth Circuit under a sex stereotyping theory.
A transgendered person may claim to be discriminated against for
failure to conform to a preconceived sex or gender stereotype. 170 A
biological male or female will often be expected to live as that sex;
by choosing to live otherwise, the person fails to meet that
stereotype. 171 It would appear that, if a transgendered, biological
male claims his employer viewed him as too feminine and
discriminated as a result, the claim would be actionable under Title
VII despite his transgendered status. 172 The same would be true for a
transgendered, biological female who is viewed as too masculine. 173
Until this theory is tested in court, however, protection against gender
identity discrimination under Title VII cannot be assured in the Ninth
Circuit.
3. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the issue of gender identity
discrimination under Title VII in 2004, 174 fifteen years after the
Supreme Court acknowledged sex stereotyping as actionable under
Title Vll. 175 When it considered the issue of whether transgendered
individuals are protected under the prohibition against sex
discrimination, it became the first federal appellate court to explicitly
hold that Title VII does extend such protection. 176 It reversed a
decision by the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio which
had dismissed Jimmie Smith's complaint. 177

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

/d. at 875 ("Under Price Waterhouse, Sanchez must prevail.").

See, e.g., id. at 864; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Nichols, 256 F.3d 864.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
See id.
See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874.
See id.
Smith v. City ofSa1em, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
See id.; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
Smith, 378 F.3d 566; Tan, supra note 133, at 589.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 566.
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Smith was employed by the Salem Fire Department for seven years
without incident. 178 Although born a biological male, he was
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID). 179 Upon receiving
the diagnosis, Smith decided to begin "expressing a more feminine
appearance on a full time basis" not only in his private life, but also
at work. 180 Shortly thereafter, Smith's coworkers began asking him
questions about and commenting on his physical appearance. 181
Smith reacted to his coworkers' inquiries and comments by
speaking to his supervisor, Thomas Eastek, and disclosing his GID
diagnosis. 182 He informed Eastek that he was presenting himself in a
more feminine way as part of his treatment and that he would likely
eventually undergo surgical gender reassignment. 183 Smith made
clear that his intent in disclosing the information was to preemptively
respond to any questions Eastek had about his recent change in
appearance, and to allow Eastek to respond to his coworkers'
comments. 184 He specifically requested, however, that the substance
of the conversation not be disclosed to any of Eastek's supervisorsparticularly Walter Greenamyer. 185 Despite this request, Eastek soon
informed Greenamyer about Smith's GID diagnosis. 186 Shortly
thereafter, Greenamyer attended multiple meetings intending to
develop a plan to terminate Smith for his transsexuality. 187
Smith initiated legal proceedings against the City of Salem after he
was informed of the plan to terminate him for being a transsexual. 188
He alleged that the Fire Department engaged in sex discrimination

178. Jd. at 568.
179. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
180. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. Smith's decision was consistent with recognized protocol for
treating Gender Identity Disorder (GID): I d.
181. I d. Smith's coworkers did not believe his appearance and mannerisms were
"masculine enough." ld.
182. Jd.
183. Jd.
184. Jd.
185. Jd.
186. Jd.
187. Jd. Greenamyer met with both the City of Salem's Executive Body and the City's
Law Director to discuss the issue. Id.
188. Jd. at 569. Ultimately, the plan devised would require Smith to submit to three
psychological evaluations with physicians chosen by the City, under the hope that he
would refuse or choose to resign. Jd. If he refused the evaluations, he would be
terminated on grounds of insubordination. ld. Salem· Safety Director Henry L.
Willard informed Smith of these intentions, prompting Smith to take preemptive
action against his ultimate termination. I d.
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and retaliation in violation of Title VII. 189 The district court
dismissed the action, but was overruled on appeal. 190
The Sixth Circuit focused on the analysis in Price Waterhouse
when evaluating Smith's sex discrimination claim. 191 Whereas the
district court was dismissive of Smith's sex stereotyping theory, 192 the
appellate court considered it valid. 193 Smith claimed his coworkers
and superiors reacted negatively to him because he was not masculine
enough. 194 The court found it sufficient, for purposes of a Title VII
sex stereotyping claim, that Smith alleged the motivating factor
behind his employers' actions to be a preconceived stereotype of how
a man should appear and behave, to which Smith did not conform. 195
In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged and
dismissed the series of federal cases permitting transgender
discrimination under Title VII as being effectively overruled. 196
Although prior jurisprudence indicated that only discrimination based
on biological sex was prohibited by the statute, Price Waterhouse
definitively changed the interpretation of the word "sex." 197 The use
of any sex stereotype in making employment decisions was found
impermissible under Title VII. 198 Thus, people who are subjected to
the stereotype because they are transgendered are no longer
prevented from invoking statutory protection. 199
Less than one year after deciding Smith v. City of Salem, 200 the
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that transgendered persons are

189. /d.
190. !d. at 566. Initially, Smith proceeded against the City of Salem through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. !d. at 569. Greenamyer responded by
suspending Smith for one twenty-four hour shift, allegedly because Smith violated
either a City or fire department policy. !d. Ultimately, Smith filed his suit in federal
district court. !d.
191. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-72.
192. See id. at 571. The district court essentially found that Smith's true claim was not one
of sex stereotyping, but that he was discriminated against for being transsexual. See
id.
193. !d. at 575.
194. !d. at 572.
195. !d.
196. /d. at 572-73. See also supra Part liLA-B.
197. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 573-74. Following the Supreme Court's decision in 1989,
gender-based discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. /d. As a result, an employer
who subjects an applicant or employee to a sex-based stereotype in making an
employment decision violates the statute. See id.
198. /d. at 574-75.
199. See id. at 575.
200. 378 F.3d 566.
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protected under Title VIL 201 The court saw no need to re-analyze the
issue, instead deferring to its previous holding. 202 Although the
opinion in Barnes v. City of CincinnatF 03 does not delve into the
intricacies of transgender rights under the statute, it makes clear that
in the Sixth Circuit, transsexuality does not bar a Title VII claim of
sex discrimination. 204 The Sixth Circuit is currently the only federal
court in which there is a clear holding that allows claims of gender
identity discrimination to proceed under a Title VII sex stereotyping
theory. 205

N. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION
From the split in the federal circuits it is clear that there is
significant confusion regarding the interpretation of the federal
government's primary employment discrimination statute. 206 Without
the Supreme Court's interpretation to provide clarity, it falls on
Congress to determine trans gender employment rights. 207 In 2007,
two potential comprehensive non-discrimination acts were proposed
in the House of Representatives. 208
A. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act

The 11 Oth Congress first attempted to pass legislation protecting
transgendered individuals from discrimination in the form of H.R.
2015. 209 On March 24, 2007, Representative Barney Frank of
Massachusetts proposed a comprehensive ace 10 that would thereafter
prohibit employment discrimination based on an individual's "actual

201. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
202. Id. at 737 ('"Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior is
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such
as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity."' (quoting
Smith, 378 F.3d at 575)).
203. 401 F.3d 729.
204. See id. at 737 ("In Smith, this court held that the district court erred in granting a
motion to dismiss by holding that transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to Title VII
protections .... "(citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 575)).
205. See id.; Smith, 378 F.3d at 570-75.
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
207. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, !lOth Cong. (2007);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007).
208. See H.R. 2015; H.R. 3685.
209. See H.R. 2015.
210. H.R. REP. No. 110-406, pt. I, at 9 (2007).
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or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity."211 This bill never
reached a vote in the House ofRepresentatives. 212
On September 28, 2007, Representative Frank, with Representative
Deborah Pryce, proposed a new version of the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA). 213 They chose to propose a new act
after determining that a comprehensive bill would not gain enough
votes to pass the House. 214 The new ENDA does not include "gender
identity" as a protected class, but instead only bars discrimination on
the basis of an individual's "actual or perceived sexual
orientation."215 The House of Representatives passed the legislation
by a vote of 235 to 184 on November 7, 2007. 216 Although the bill
was read in the Senate twice, it was not voted on by the Senate before
the 110th Congress concluded. 217
B. Public Response to the Amended ENDA

1. Criticisms in the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered
Community
The revised ENDA has been criticized for providing too narrow
protections with too broad of a religious exemption. 218 Although
some individuals view the act as a positive "historic milestone," 219
much of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT)
community opposes the amended ENDA because it does not include
gender identity as a protected class. 22° For example, the National

211.
212.
213.
214.

215.
216.
217.

218.

219.

220.

H.R. 2015.
See H.R. REP. No. 110-406, pt. 1, at 49-52.
!d. at 9.
Christine Daniels, Op-Ed., Civil rights for LGB ... and T, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10,2007,
at A21, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-oe-daniels
I Ooct 10,0,3386369 .story.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007).
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 1057 (Nov. 7, 2007),
available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007 /roll! 057 .xml.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, H.R. 3685-SUMMARY OF ALL ACTIONS, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/search.html (search "H.R. 3685"; then follow "All
Congressional Actions") (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
See Kathleen Clark, SALT Statement on Employment Non-Discrimination Act (HR
3685) and Call for Action, Soc'Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, Oct. 17,2007, available at
http://www.saltlaw.org/-salt2007/files/uploads/! 0-17-07SALT_Statement_on_
Employment _Non_O.pdf.
See Kathi Wolfe, Editorial, Another Voice: House Passage of the Anti-Discrimination
Bill Is a Historic Milestone, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Nov. 17, 2007, at
Al8.
See Clark, supra note 218.
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Center for Lesbian Rights has viewed this attempt at incremental
protection with scorn, stating, "[w]e are being asked what no
community involved in a civil rights struggle should ever be asked to
do: leave part of our community behind in order to secure an advance
for some. " 221
It is not just activist organizations that are displeased with
Representative Frank's decision to exclude protection for
transgendered individuals. Joumalists222 and private citizens 223 alike
have spoken out against the new bill. While most admit that
minorities have historically gained civil rights in incremental steps, 224
few accept Representative Frank's decision to leave an entire group
behind as a step forward in the quest for comprehensive civil
rights. 225 Rather, many consider Representative Frank's actions a
betrayal. 226 The new bill does not promote all-inclusive civil rights,
but instead sets transgendered individuals back in their quest to
obtain equal treatment under federal law.
2. Concerns that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act is OverBroad
Although much of the LGBT community finds the ENDA to be
insufficient, it would be a fallacy to assume that all, or even most, of
the bill's criticism stems from its failure to protect against gender
identity discrimination. Opponents of the bill have also criticized it
as being too broad. 227 They fear that granting federal protection
against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
will result in frivolous lawsuits. 228 Republicans, such as Ron Paul,
even believe the bill sweeps widely enough to effectively impose a
quota on employers. 229 This fear, however, is in direct conflict with
221. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT,
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/ENDA_ Talking_Points_formatted_FINAL.p
df (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
222. See Daniels, supra note 214.
223. See Matt Forman, Letter to the Editor, Falling Short on Equal Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ll/16/opinionllwebl6gay.html.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. Journalist Christine Daniels describes Representative Frank's actions as
having "low-bridg[ed]" the transgender community. Daniels, supra note 214
(explaining that "low bridg[ing]" is "the act of suddenly taking out a player's legs ...
a cheap and devious move .... ").
227. See Editorial, Test ofTolerance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,2007, at A24.
228. See Wolfe, supra note 219.
229. See Tara Bozick, Anti-Discrimination Bill Against Gays Making Its Way Through
Congress, VICTORIA ADVOCATE (Victoria, Tex.), Dec. 6, 2007, at A4 ("Paul, a
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the bill's express provision in subsection (f), entitled "No Preferential
Treatment or Quotas," which provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted to
require or permit( 1) any covered entity to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of the actual or
perceived sexual orientation of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any actual or
perceived sexual orientation employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by any employment
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program,
in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such actual or perceived sexual orientation in any
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section, or other area;
or
(2) the adoption or implementation by a covered entity of
a quota on the basis of actual or perceived sexual
orientation. 230
·
C. Legal Repercussions of the Amended Act
1. The Possibility of Transgendered Protection
Despite the public criticism of the ENDA being too narrow in its
protections, it is possible that a bill which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of "perceived sexual orientation" might provide protection
to transgendered individuals. 231 However, it would aid transgendered
persons only when an employer believes that the applicant or
employee is not heterosexual. 232 Even then, it is unclear to what
extent protection would be granted. 233 The term "perceived" is not

230.
231.
232.
233.

Republican, believes ... employers would hire [homosexual or bisexual] people to
avoid being charged with discrimination.").
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, llOth Cong. § 4(f) (2007).
/d. at § 4(a).
See Amy M. Scott, Expanding Employer Liability: Mental Health Parity and Sexual
Orientation Protections, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REv., Dec. 2007, at 29.
See id.
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defined in House Bill 3685. 234 Without a definition to explain what it
means to discriminate based on an individual's "perceived sexual
orientation," it is likely that the courts would have difficulty
determining who Congress intended to protect. 235
2. Potential Judicial Exclusion of Gender Identity as a Protected
Class
While some possibility of trans gender protection under House Bill
3685 or a similarly phrased bill exists, it is more likely that the
passage of an act protecting only sexual orientation will wreak havoc
on protections which transgendered persons currently receive in some
circuits?36 To date, the federal appellate courts have been called on
only to determine whether Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sex also extends protection to
transgendered individuals. 237 The circuits which allow claims of
gender identity discrimination to proceed, do so by finding that an
employer imposed a sex stereotype on a given applicant or
employee. 238 The courts have not, however, had to contend with a
situation in which Congress has considered, and effectively rejected,
a bill barring employers from discriminating based on gender
identity. Should a bill similar to H.R. 3685 be enacted, this is
precisely the situation the courts will face next.
The maxim of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio
alterius stands for the proposition that when Congress explicitly
mentions one possibility in a statute, it is presumed to have excluded
all others. 239 This maxim is somewhat limited, as it "has force only
when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or
series;' justifying the inference that items not mentioned were
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence."240 In the case of
employment discrimination protection, it is clear that the enumerated
protected classes are members of such an "associated group or
series."241 Should Congress amend Title VII to include sexual
orientation, but not gender identity, as a protected class, the maxim

234. See H.R. 3685; Scott, supra note 232, at 29.
235. See Scott, supra note 232, at 29.
236. See supra Part III.C.
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See supra Part III.C.3.
239. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (citing United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
240. ld (quoting Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65).
241. ld; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (2006).

2009)

Gender Confusion: The Need for Effective Legislation

161

would apply. 242 The history of H.R. 2015 would provide explicit
proof that Congress has both considered and rejected the possibility
of banning employment discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. 243
What is unclear is whether the Supreme Court would extend the
maxim where there are multiple statutes legislating on the same
matter. The proposed ENDAs would not have amended Title VII,
but would have expanded employment discrimination protection by
way of an entirely separate statute. 244 However, Representative
Frank's deliberate exclusion of gender identity as a protected class
when proposing H.R. 3685 245 may prompt the Supreme Court to
conclude that gender identity is not protected either under Title VII,
should the issue reach the Court, or under any future act banning
sexual orientation discrimination. Such a judicial presumption would
devastate transgender rights currently acknowledged m some
circuits. 246
V. THE STATE RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION
Although Congress has yet to include gender identity as a protected
class under Title VII or a separate statute, 247 some states have
recognized and assumed the duty to grant protection. 248 At present,
thirteen states and Washington, D.C., protect individuals against
discrimination based on their gender expression. 249 Amongst the
most recent states to grant protection to transgendered individuals are
Iowa/50 New Jersey/51 and Colorado. 252 In 2007, all three of these

242. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168 (citing Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65).
243. Daniels, supra note 214, at A2l. Representative Frank did not merely propose
alternative legislation after he initially sponsored H.R. 2015. !d. Rather, he took note
that preliminary polls showed that the bill would not pass if it came to a vote in the
House of Representatives in its original form, and subsequently proposed legislation
that deliberately excluded "gender identity" from its protection. /d.
244. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007).
245. Daniels, supra note 214, at A21.
246. See supra Part III.C.
247. See supra Part IV.A.
248. Michelle Garcia, ENDA, State by State, THE ADVOCATE (Los Angeles, Cal.), Nov. 20,
2007, available at http:www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id= 171535
165.
249. /d.
250. See IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6(l)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2009).
251. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12(a}-(c) (West Supp. 2009).
252. See Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-401(7.5), -402(l)(a)-{c) (West 2008 & West
Supp. 2008).
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states enacted new legislation explicitly prohibiting gender identity
discrimination. 253
Beginning July 1, 2007/54 Iowa's Civil Rights Act provided
comprehensive protection against discrimination. 255
Whereas
previously the Act closely resembled Title VII, it now includes both
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. 256
Further, the Act gives expansive definitions to each of these newly
acknowledged categories. 257
Sexual orientation includes an
individual's actual or perceived sexual preference. 258
Gender
identity, meanwhile, is defined as being "a gender-related identity of
a person, regardless of the person's assigned sex at birth." 259 Under
the Act, it is now illegal for an employer, subject to specific
exemptions/60 to refuse to hire, terminate, or otherwise discriminate
against an individual due to his or her sexual orientation or gender
identity. 261
Like Iowa, New Jersey has amended its existing non-discrimination
act to provide protection against gender identity discrimination. 262
Effective June 17, 2007, the State's "Law Against Discrimination"263
bars employers from discriminating on the basis of an individual's
gender identity or expression. 264 The statute defines "[g]ender
identity or expression" as "having or being perceived as having a
gender related identity or expression whether or not stereotypically
associated with a person's assigned sex at birth." 265 This expansive

253.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

State Legislative Action Expanding Protected Classes for Employment Discrimination
to Include Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, NEWS FLASH (Koley Jessen, P.C.,
Omaha, Neb.), Aug. 2007, at 1-2, http://www.koleyjessen.com/assets/Newsflash
August2007.pdf[hereinafter State Legislative Action].
!d. at I.
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009).
!d.§ 216.6(l)(a).
!d.§ 216.2(10), (14).
See id. § 216.2(14).
!d.§ 216.2(10).
!d. § 216.6(6). All exemptions save one apply to all protected groups under the Act.
!d. The Act does contain a religious exemption, however, which only allows a bona
fide religious organization to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity, so long as the employer's actions are related to a "bona fide religious
purpose." !d. § 216.6(6)(d).
!d.§ 216.6(l)(a).
State Legislative Action, supra note 253, at 2.
!d.
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12(a) (West 2009).
!d. § 10:5-5(rr).
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definition266 grants protection to transsexuals, transvestites, and other
transgenderists where it did not previously exist in New Jersey.
The State of Colorado adopted a different approach to gender
identity discrimination than either Iowa267 or New Jersey. 268 Its
employment non-discrimination statute does not include gender
identity as a protected class, but does include sexual orientation. 269
The term "sexual orientation," however, is given an expansive
definition: "a person's orientation toward heterosexuality,
homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or an employer's
perception thereof.'mo Through this broad definition of sexual
orientation, the Colorado legislature explicitly prohibits
discrimination against transgendered individuals. 271
VI. MARYLAND'S RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION
A. Current State-Level Legislation
At present, the State of Maryland is not among those that include
gender identity as a protected class. 272 Although Maryland does
prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation,
the legislature has not yet seen fit to extend similar protections to the
transgendered community. 273 Unlike Colorado, Maryland currently
defines sexual orientation narrowly: "the identification of an
individual as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or
bisexuality. " 274
Although gender identity is not yet a protected class in Maryland,
attempts have been made by delegates in the state legislature to
remedy that fact. 275 On March 3, 2008, a bill was introduced in the
Maryland House of Delegates with the purpose of adding "gender

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

275.

See supra Part ILA.
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009).
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12 (West Supp. 2009).
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 24-34-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2008).
Id. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2008).
Seeid.
See Mo. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-606(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2009).
See id.
Compare Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2008) (including an
individual's transgendered status within the definition of sexual orientation), with Mo.
CoDE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-lOl(f) (LexisNexis 2009) (limiting sexual orientation
to the concepts of heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality).
See H.B. 1598, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008).
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identity" to the enumerated protected classes. 276 If passed, the bill
would have defined gender identity as being "a gender-related
identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of an individual
regardless of the individual's assigned sex at birth."277 Employers
would be prohibited from refusing to hire, terminating, or otherwise
discriminating against an employee or applicant based on gender
identity. 278 This bill died when the Maryland General Assembly
adjourned on April 7, 2008. 279
In February of2009, legislation virtually identical to that before the
House of Delegates in 2008 was again proposed, this time in both the
House of Delegates 280 and the Maryland State Senate. 281 Although
the proposed bills sought to expand the protected classes in Maryland
to include gender identity/ 82 defined in a manner identical to the
2008 proposal, 283 both bills died again when the legislative session
ended on April 13, 2009. 284
B. Local Protection
Within the State of Maryland, two local jurisdictions285 provide
protection against discrimination beyond that granted by the state. 286
Baltimore City explicitly bars employers from discriminating based

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

285.
286.

Jd. The proposed bill was similar in form to that enacted in Iowa in 2007. Compare
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009), with Md. H.B. 1598.
Md H.B. 1598.
Id.
Maryland HB 1598/SB 976, https://www.hrc.org/issues/transgender/9348.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2009).
H.B. 474,2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
S.B. 566, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
The House Bill was proposed on February 4, 2009. Md. H.B. 474. The Senate Bill
was proposed on February 6, 2009. Md. S.B. 566.
Compare H.B. 1598, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008), with H.B. 474, 2009 Leg.,
426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
Maryland HB 474/SB 566, http://www.hrc.org/issues/transgender/12563.htm (last
visited Aug. 29, 2009). Before it died at the end of the legislative session, the House
Bill was sponsored by 67 of Maryland's 141 delegates. HousE BILL 474,
http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/billfilelhb0474.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009);
WELCOME TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://mlis.state.md.us/#gena (last
visited Aug. 29, 2009). The Senate Bill was sponsored by 14 of the 47 state Senators.
SENATE BILL 566, http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/billfile/SB0566.htm (last visited Aug.
2009);
WELCOME
TO
THE
MARYLAND
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY,
29,
http://mlis.state.md.us/#gena (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
See supra note 57.
See BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2003); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Mo.,
CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009).
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on an individual's gender identity or expression. 287 The ordinance,
which became effective January 5, 2003/88 defines gender identity or
expression as "an individual's having or being perceived as having a
gender-related self-identity, self-image, appearance, expression, or
behavior, whether or not those gender-related characteristics differ
from those associated with the individual's assigned sex at birth. "289
Baltimore City is not the only Maryland jurisdiction to legislate on
the issue of gender identity discrimination. In 2007, the Montgomery
County Council unanimously passed an ordinance expanding county
protections to include gender identity as a protected class.Z90 The
ordinance prohibits an employer from engaging in discrimination
based on gender identity. 291 Montgomery County defines gender
identity in a manner virtually identical to Baltimore City's
ordinance. 292
Both the Baltimore City93 and the Montgomery County294
ordinances are prime examples of the form of protection which
It is important to
transgendered individuals should receive.
remember, however, that these comprehensive non-discrimination
statutes only apply to employers in the jurisdictions in which they
were passed. An individual will only be protected when employed
by, or applying to, an employer within the borders of these
progressive jurisdictions. It is still necessary for the Maryland
General Assembly to legislate on the issue of gender identity

287.
288.

289.
290.

291.
292.

293.
294.

BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4, § 3-1 (2008).
CMTY. RELATIONS COMM'N, DISCRIMINATION IS ILLEGAL! TRANSGENDER PEOPLE HAVE
THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION (2003),
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/community/downloads/1208/Transgender
_Brochure_Green.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4, § l-1(1-1) (2003).
Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Task Force Expresses
Disappointment in Montgomery County Court Decision (July 24, 2008),
http://www. thetaskforce.org/press/releases/pr_ 072408.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009).
Compare BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4, § 1-1(1-1) (2008) (defining gender
identity as "an individual's having or being perceived as having a gender-related selfidentity, self-image, appearance, expression, or behavior, whether or not those genderrelated characteristics differ from those associated with the individual's assigned sex
at birth."), with MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-6 (2008) (defining
gender identity as "an individual's actual or perceived gender, including a person's
gender-related appearance, expression, image, identity, or behavior, whether or not
those gender-related characteristics differ from the characteristics customarily
associated with the person's assigned sex at birth.").
BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2009).
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009).
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discrimination.
Transgendered citizens m Maryland will not
adequately be protected otherwise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Gender identity discrimination is a significant problem in the
United States. Multiple studies have shown that approximately fifty
percent of transgendered individuals report having experienced
discrimination in the workplace. 295 Yet, to date, transgendered
individuals receive, at best, inconsistent protection under Title VII. 296
Although there have been attempts to expand federal protection
against employment discrimination, these efforts are insufficient both
in immediacy and comprehensiveness. 297 The delayed action on
proposed federal House Bill 3685, coupled with the absence of
protection against gender identity discrimination, leaves a hole in the
law. 298 If an act such as the proposed ENDA passes, transgendered
individuals will be even less certain of protection than if it does
not. 299 Passage of an act that establishes sexual orientation as a
protected class while failing to include gender identity may even
create a judicial presumption that Congress intended to exclude
gender identity from receiving federal protection. 300
Due to Congress's failure to enact federal legislation, states have
assumed the responsibility of protecting transgendered citizens. 301
Maryland, however, has yet to include gender identity as a protected
class. 302 It has therefore fallen on Maryland's local jurisdictions to
grant comprehensive civil rights to citizens. 303
In light of Congress's failure to prohibit employment
discrimination against the LGBT community, the Maryland General
Assembly must weigh in on the side of protection. The state
legislature should follow Montgomery County's model 304 by
providing broad protections that include gender identity as a
protected class in Maryland. To do otherwise separates the LGBT

295.
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297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Kyler W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Protections for
Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang,
& Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006).
See supra Part III. C.
See supra Part IV.A-B.
See supra Part IV.C.l-2.
See supra Part IV.C.l-2.
See supra Part IV.C.2.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI .A.
See supra Part Vl.B.
See supra Part VI. B.
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community into two groups, causing individuals who share one cause
to receive disparate treatment. Existing state law, though it provides
greater protection than that available on a federal level, 305 remains
insufficient. The law is designed to protect all citizens, not to classify
them in a manner that allows discrimination to occur. The only way
to provide adequate protection in Maryland is for the state legislature
to pass a comprehensive non-discrimination statute. This will ensure
that employers make legitimate employment decisions rather than
taking action against individuals based solely on animus toward
others' lifestyles.
Courtney J. Jefferson

305.

Compare Mo. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-606(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2009), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (2006).

